Wright State University

CORE Scholar
International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology - 2005

International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology

2005

Evaluation of Pilot and Runway Characteristics Associated with
Runway Incursions
Kathleen McGarry
Gregory Niehus

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005
Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
McGarry, K., & Niehus, G. (2005). Evaluation of Pilot and Runway Characteristics Associated with Runway
Incursions. 2005 International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 490-495.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005/74

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2005 by an
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

EVALUATION OF PILOT AND RUNWAY CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED
WITH RUNWAY INCURSIONS
Kathleen McGarry
Titan Corporation
Washington, DC
Gregory Niehus
Titan Corporation
Mays Landing, NJ
A study was conducted to determine possible pilot and airport characteristics that could be used to predict surface
incidents (SI) committed by pilots. The study was conducted by analyzing the videotape data from a previous
simulation study (Surface Technology Assessment Product Team, 2004) that tested the ability of dynamic taxiway
message signs called Addressable Message Boards (AMB) to enhance pilot situation awareness (SA) and reduce the
likelihood of SIs at controlled airports. The current study did not take into consideration the impact of AMBs on
SIs, but specifically focused on pilot and scenario characteristics. The results of the study indicate that pilots who
committed SIs had logged fewer hours in the past six months than the pilots that did not commit a SI. In addition,
pilots who committed SIs also had less experience at controlled airports than pilots who did not commit a SI. Pilots
committing SIs also had lower situation awareness and higher levels of workload. It is likely that the combination
of less recent flight experience and less experience at controlled airports were the cause of increased workload and
lower SA for some pilots. The resultant increased workload and decreased SA led to a higher likelihood of these
pilots committing surface incidents.
Introduction
Between FY 2000 and 2003, the National Airspace
System (NAS) managed approximately 262 million
flight operations. Of these, 1,475 resulted in runway
incursions. That averages out to about five runway
incursions per million operations (Office of Runway
Safety, 2004).
The FAA is evaluating and
identifying strategies and emerging technologies for
increasing runway safety.
The FAA defines a runway incursion as “any
occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle,
person or object on the ground that creates a collision
hazard or results in a loss of separation with an
aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or
intending to land.” The FAA categorizes runway
incursions into three error types: operational errors,
pilot deviations, and vehicle/pedestrian deviations
(Office of Runway Safety, 2004). An operational
error is defined as an action of an air traffic controller
that results in an aircraft landing or departing on a
closed runway, or less than the required separation
distance between two aircraft, or between an aircraft
and another obstacle (such as a vehicle, equipment or
personnel). A pilot deviation is an action taken by a
pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation,
such as if a pilot fails to follow air traffic control
(ATC) instructions to hold short and not cross an
active runway. A vehicle/pedestrian deviation occurs
when pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfere
with airport operations by entering or moving on the

runway movement area without authorization (Office
of Runway Safety).
The FAA has developed five operational dimensions
that affect runway incursions: available reaction time;
evasive or corrective action; environmental
conditions; speed of aircraft and/or vehicle and;
proximity of aircraft and/or vehicle (Office of
Runway Safety, 2001). These five dimensions were
involved with the development of runway incursion
categories based on severity. These categories are:
•

Accident: A runway incursion that resulted
in a collision.

•

A: Separation decreases and participants
take extreme action to narrowly avoid a
collision.

•

B: Separation decreases, and there is
significant potential for collision.

•

C: Separation decreases, but there is enough
time and distance to avoid a collision.

•

D: Little or no chance of a collision, but
meets the definition of incursion

One of the main safety goals of the FAA is to reduce the
rate of runway incursions. In addition to runway
incursions, there are also SIs. An SI is any event “where
unauthorized or unapproved movement occurs within
the movement area associated with the operation of an
aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of flight”
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(Air Traffic Evaluations and Investigations Staff, 2002).
SIs result from the same things as runway incursions:
pilot deviations, operational errors, vehicle or pedestrian
deviations and operational deviations. These surface
incidents would result in a runway incursion if there was
another vehicle in conflict at the time the incident occurs
(Koenig, 1995).
With the increasing demand on the NAS for air travel,
airport surfaces are becoming more crowded. While
many air carriers suffered decreases in air traffic
following September 11, 2001, demand for air travel is
on the rise again. Congestion at airports is a major
safety concern, and finding ways to prevent runway
incursions is an area of research interest. Runway
safety is managed by the pilots and air traffic
controllers, who use visual and radio communications
to maintain separation on the airport movement area.
The airport movement area is the area where aircraft
and vehicles are required to have permission from the
air traffic control tower to operate (Pope, 1990). The
path they are to follow is given to them by radio
communication from the ground controller. The
ground controller must maintain an awareness of
where all aircraft are that they have given taxi
instructions to. This is to avoid giving an aircraft a
route to follow that will put them in the path of another
aircraft or vehicle. The pilot and flight crew must
either write down the taxi instructions or memorize
them, and then follow the airport signs to their
destination (Young and Jones, 1998). Often, position
awareness is determined by both pilots and controllers
through visual scans of the airport surface, using signs,
lights, and pavement markings. Often, pilots use a
paper surface map to assist them in determining
position awareness. This may be especially true at
unfamiliar airports (Young, et al, 1998).
The fact that much of positional awareness is based on
visual scans of the airport surface makes it difficult to
maintain awareness if visibility drops, if there is
uncertainty regarding the correct path, or if there are
obstacles such as other traffic in the way. This is true
especially at unfamiliar airports. Position uncertainty
can cause pilots to slow down until they gain a better
idea of their position. It can also cause them to continue
at speed, but with a lowered level of comfort (Young, et
al 1998). The way that route information is given voice communications - can be unsafe, if the
communications are misunderstood or unclear. Pilots
occasionally have difficulty understanding clearances,
especially if the airport has a complex configuration.
The pilots may also mis-hear messages intended for
another aircraft, especially if the call sign for the
intended aircraft is similar. Pilots can ‘hear’ a clearance
that is expected, even if it is not given. They may act on

their expectations, and not on the actual clearance given
(Pope, 1990).
There are many factors that go into the cause of a
runway incursion. The factors that go into the human
error that cause runway incursions have been
examined in previous research. The factors include:
how pilots navigate the airport surface; how the
runways and taxiways are identified (signs, lights,
etc); communications (message content and message
delivery); pilot and controller memory; situation
awareness; lack of standardization; variability of
training; pilots knowing where they are located;
pilots knowing where other traffic is located; pilots
knowing where to go on the airport surface (Jones,
2002; Adam, Lentz & Blair, 1992).
Study Objectives
The purpose of this study was to examine questions
emanating from the simulation data collected during
the AMB study involving runway incursion
prevention
technology
(Surface
Technology
Assessment Product Team, 2004). The current
research endeavored to identify factors that can be
used to predict and prevent runway incursions based
on pilot performance in the AMB taxi scenarios. A
second objective was to examine whether the
methodology utilized in the previous study can be
used to learn more about SIs in the NAS to predict
airport surface safety risks. The study investigated
whether or not the methodology used in the AMB
study would be useful in attempting to predict
runway incursions based on knowledge of pilots and
the scenarios that they typically experience.
Also of interest was whether or not violations of hold
short instructions were predictable from the AMB
scenarios. If they are, ‘typical’ surface scenarios for
an airport could be assessed, and used in conjunction
with knowledge about the pilot population to predict
‘typical’ airport safety risk areas. The scenario
characteristics examined included: surface traffic,
airport layout, unexpected surface characteristics, and
radio communication.
Method
This research was an extension of a previous simulation
study examining the use of dynamic message signs as a
method of mitigating runway incursions (Surface
Technology Assessment Product Team, 2004). This
study extracted data from the AMB videotapes for use
in the analysis of pilot characteristics and performance
to look for possible causal factors and predictors of
runway incursions and SIs.
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Apparatus
The original AMB study was conducted using a realtime, high fidelity general aviation cockpit simulator
at the William J. Hughes Technical Center Cockpit
Simulation Facility (CSF), configured as a Cessna
421. The visual system was a projector-based display
system designed to provide the pilot/copilot with an
Out of the Window (OTW) display on the
windscreen. Three high resolution projectors were
used to project the OTW view. Their purpose was to
display a scene with realistic depth of field cues for
the pilot. Microsoft Flight-simulator 2002 was used
to generate and display the visual scenes. In addition,
the audio system allowed for radio communication
between pilot and controller, and provided simulated
engine sounds.
Participants

on the data and the results of these analyses are
reported below. Communications data analysis is not
reported here due to loss of sound in over 50% of
the videotapes.
Out of 140 experimental runs in the simulation, there
were 13 SIs, committed by 10 pilots. Three of these
pilots committed two SIs. These were all violation of
hold-short instructions.
The 10 pilots who committed SIs were on average
less experienced than the other 18 pilots who did not
commit SIs. In terms of overall flight experience,
pilots who had SIs had logged fewer flight hours than
pilots without incidents (482 flight hours versus 1940
hours). However, the test showed that this did not
reach statistical significance F(1, 25) = 3.956, p =
.058, as shown in Figure 1; therefore, the null
hypothesis could not be rejected.
Average Total Flight Hours

Researchers used video and questionnaire data from
the 28 pilots who participated in the AMB study.
The pilots performed taxi operations in a Cessna 421
in a simulated environment in six scenarios from four
different airports. The airports, selected based on the
Runway Incursion Assessment Report (FAA, TAT
2002), were: Long Beach Airport, California (LGB);
Crystal Airport, Minnesota (MIC); Flying Cloud
Airport, Minnesota (FCM); and Centennial Airport,
Colorado (APA). Crystal Airport had two scenarios,
SOD and MIC.
For each airport, researchers
replicated one or two specific intersections identified
as runway incursion hotspots and used them as the
basis for a taxi scenario in the simulator. Objective
and subjective data were collected throughout the
simulation. Researchers analyzed the data to look for
any patterns that are suggestive of runway incursion
causal factors. Researchers viewed video tapes of
pilots performing taxiing operations. The data
collected included: total taxi time, taxi speed, number
of stops, time spent looking at airport surface map,
whether or not a surface incident occurred, scan time,
and head-up time.

2500
2000
1500
1000
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0
Surface Incident

No Surface Incident

Figure 1. Surface incidents as a function of overall
experience level
There was a statistically significant difference in
number of flight hours in the past six months between
those pilots who had at least one SI and those who
did not (32.7 hours vs. 97.9 hours); F(1,25) = 7.213,
p < .05, as shown in Figure 2. The recent flight hour
data of one participant was excluded from analysis
because the participant was also a commercial pilot
who had many more flight hours than any of the
other participants.

28 pilots participated in the simulation study. The
pilots were all General Aviation pilots, and had an
average age of 43 years. They had an average of 13
years flight experience. Participants had logged an
average of 1400 hours total flight time, and an
average of 82 hours logged in the past 6 months.
Results
The results attempted to look at different aspects of
pilot performance and behavior to see if there are any
links to RIs/SIs. Statistical analyses were performed
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Figure 2. Surface incidents as a function of recent
flight time

Average Flight Hours in Last
6 Months

On average, those pilots with the lowest number of
flight hours in the past six months had more SIs than
those with higher numbers of recent flight hours;
F(2,24) = 3.578, p < .05 (see Figure 3).
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Figure 4. Average situation awareness ratings as a
function of number of surface incidents
Pilots who committed SIs reported significantly
lower SA than pilots without SIs; F (9, 18) = 4.165, p
< .05 (see Figure 5).

0 Surface
Incidents

1 Surface
Incident

2 Surface
Incidents

Figure 3. Number of surface incidents committed by
pilots as a function of average flight hours
It was found that on average, pilots who committed
SIs reported a smaller percentage of their flight
experience at towered airports than those pilots that
did not have SIs; F(1,25) = 6.438, p < .05. Those
who committed SIs estimated that 26.6% of their
flight operations were conducted at towered airports,
while those who did not commit SIs estimated
conducting of 55.1% of their flight operations at
towered airports.
The amount of ‘head-up’ time spent in the scenarios
show that those who committed SIs tended to spend
less time looking out the window than those who did
not commit surface incidents. However, there was
not a statistically significant difference in overall
percentage of head-up time between those who
committed SIs and those who did not. The average
percentage of time spent looking out the window by
those who committed SI was 93.9%, while average
head up time was 94.4% for those who did not
commit an SI.

Average Situation Awareness
Rating

Average Flight Hours in Last 6
Months

There was a significant difference in pilot-reported
SA between scenarios, F(4,24)=3.026, p < .05. There
was also a trend of lower SA with increasing
numbers of SIs across scenarios (see Figure 4), with
the exception of the LGB scenario. The LGB
scenario had the second lowest SA rating, but only
had one SI.
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Figure 5. Average situation awareness ratings as a
function of surface incidents
When looking at situation awareness ratings by
scenario, there were some significant differences, as
shown in Figure 6. In the MIC SOD scenario, those
pilots who had an SI reported significantly lower SA
than those pilots who did not have an SI; F(1, 250) =
14.306; p < .01. In the LGB scenario, pilots who had
SIs also reported significantly lower SA; F(1,25) =
14.389; p < .01. In the FCM scenario, pilots who
committed SIs tended to report lower SA. However,
the difference was not statistically significant:
F(1,250) = 3.902; p = .059.
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Figure 6. Average situation awareness ratings as a
function of scenario and occurrence of surface
incidents
Pilots who committed SIs tend to report higher
mental workload (as measured by the NASA TLX)
than pilots without incidents.
However, the
difference in reported workload ratings for those who
had SIs and those who did not was not statistically
significant: F(1, 25)=3.205, p=.08. The average
reported workload for those participants who
committed an SI was 47.78, and for those who did
not commit an SI it was 40.196 (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Average workload ratings as a function of
surface incidents
No other data from the simulations indicated
statistically significant differences.
This data
included the number of times pilots stopped during
taxi, how long pilots spent looking at the taxi
diagram (both before and during taxi), the rate of taxi
speed, the number of times pilots scanned outside the
cockpit and the amount of time spent scanning.
Discussion
This study examined pilot and scenario
characteristics that may aid in pointing out causal
factors for runway incursions and SIs. The results of
this study suggest that there are some pilot
characteristics that may be associated with a higher

probability of committing SIs. Those pilots with
fewer flight hours total tended to be more likely to
commit SIs. Pilots with fewer flight hours in the past
six months also tended to have more SIs. Pilots who
spent less time at towered airports were more likely
to have SIs. The amount of time spent looking out of
the cockpit was found to be related to occurrence of
SIs, but was not enough to be used as a predictor of
SIs. Those pilots who commited SIs tended to report
lower levels of SA, and higher levels of workload
than those pilots who did not commit SIs.
The finding of a significant difference in flight hours
during the past 6 months suggests that pilot
training/experience may have an effect on the rate of
SIs. The results suggest that the more recent flight
experience a pilot has, the less likely the pilot is to
commit an SI. Logging more recent flight hours aids
the pilot in maintaining proficiency with proper
procedures and pilot skills. The amount of total
flight time and experience a pilot has is also related
to whether or not they had a SI. Those pilots who
had a SI tended to have fewer total flight hours than
those who did not have a SI. Taken with the findings
on recent flight hours, this suggests that experience
and training may be predictive which pilots are more
likely to commit an SI.
Pilots who committed SIs reported a lower
percentage of their flight operations being conducted
at towered airports. This finding suggests that pilots
who do not have much experience at towered airports
are more likely to commit an SI. The larger size and
higher complexity of towered airport layouts may
contribute to pilots who are not used to the size and
complexity being more likely to commit an SI. In
addition, the increased amount of traffic and the need
to communicate with ATC may also increase the
workload of pilots not used to operations in the
towered environment. The increased workload may
reduce the SA of pilots who are not as familiar with
towered airports.
There appears to be a trend relating reported SA and
scenarios. Pilots generally reported lower SA in the
scenarios with higher incident rates. Although all of
the scenarios were chosen for the simulation because
they were known to have a high frequency of pilots
committing SIs, the pilot participants had more
difficultly with certain scenarios than others, as
evidenced by both the higher frequency of SIs
committed, and the lower average SA ratings for
those scenarios.
Overall, pilots who committed an SI had lower SA
than pilots who did not. In addition, although the
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difference was not statistically significant, pilots who
committed an SI had higher average workload
ratings. It is likely that the combination of less recent
flight experience and less experience at controlled
airports were the cause of increased workload and
lower SA for some pilots. The fact that the pilots
were taxiing for the first time at airports known for
high rates of SIs also likely led to increased workload
and lowered SA. For example, the MIC SOD
scenario instructed pilots to hold short of a sod
runway. This is an unusual element on the airport
surface, and pilots may not have had the necessary
experience with it to know what to look for. As a
result, there was lowered SA, seemingly attributed to
the airport surface. The resultant increased workload
and decreased SA led to a higher likelihood of these
pilots committing SIs.
The fact that those pilot who had higher levels of
recent flight hours also tended to not have SIs
suggests that experience and/or training may help in
reducing incidents. The recency of experience may
also be predictive of surface safety. Continued
training, and keeping pilots current with flight hours
may be a way to help reduce SIs.
While there were some factors identified from this
research that are suggestive of predictors of who will
commit an SI, the study was not designed with this in
mind. In order to confirm the predictive factors of
who will commit SIs, it would be necessary to design
a study with that purpose in mind.
Future efforts to continue to examine runway safety
should include the development of a model to
synthesize these results. The model may be used to
predict SIs, thereby generalizing the results to other
airports and scenarios, as well as confirming and
identifying additional pilot characteristics that
increase the likelihood of SIs. Therefore, current
knowledge of the airport surface and pilot
characteristics could be used to more accurately
predict and reduce the likelihood of SIs.
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